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at lavv

Drugged
by Carl E. Schneider

T

he Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Oregon, like
its decision last year in Gonzales
v. Raich (the "medical marijuana'' case),
again raises questions about the bioethical consequences of the Controlled Substances Act. When, in 1970, Congress
passed that act, it placed problematic
drugs in one of five "schedules," and it
authorized the U.S. attorney general to
add or subtract drugs from the schedules. Drugs in schedule II have both a
medical use and a high potential for
abuse. Doctors may prescribe such drugs
if they "obtain from the Attorney General a registration issued in accordance
with the rules and regulations promulgated by him." The attorney general
may deny or revoke a doctor's registration if registration would be "inconsistent with the public interest." In evaluating "the public interest," the attorney
general considers, among other things,
"conduct which may threaten the public
health and safety." In 1971 the attorney
general issued a regulation requiring that
prescriptions for controlled substances
"be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting
in the usual course of his professional
practice."
So far, so good; this is all common
ground. The issues Gonzales v. Oregon
presents had their origins in 2001, when
Attorney General Ashcroft promulgated
an "Interpretive Rule" which "determine[d] that assisting suicide is not a 'legitimate medical purpose' within the
meaning of21 CFR Sec. 1306.4 (2001),

and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances violates the CSA. Such conduct
by a physician ... may 'render his registration ... inconsistent with the public
.Interest. '"
The Interpretive Rule did not preempt Oregon's legalization of assisted
suicide, but it did impede assisted suicide, since controlled substances are the
standard means of assistance. Oregon
therefore asked the federal courts to
keep the attorney general from enforcing his rule. The case eventually reached
the Supreme Court. What was the
Court's task?
A common public expectation was
that the Supreme Court would-finally-decide whether assisted suicide is
good policy. That, however, is not the
Court's job. There are some areas of law
in which some courts are supposed to
consider and decide what public policy
should be. These are the areas in which
state courts have inherited the "common
law" authority of English courts, areas
like the law of property, of contracts,
and of torts (civil wrongs). In those
areas, English courts made law before
Parliament had become an effective legislature. That authority persisted even
when Parliament came into its own, and
that authority was inherited by American state courts. In common law areas,
courts principally apply precedent, but
when necessary they are expected to
think in policy terms. Even in those
areas, of course, judicial decisions can be
overridden by the legislature.

The federal courts, however, have
(basically) not inherited the common
law power to make public policy. For
our purposes, the federal courts have
only two tasks-to interpret the Constitution and to interpret federal statutes.
So, was the Court's assignment in
this case to decide whether the Interpretive Rule exceeded the federal government's constitutional authority? It could
have been. The federal government's
power is not plenary; it has only the authority the Constitution accords it. Oregon claimed that the attorney general's
interpretation of the CSA exceeded constitutional bounds and trenched too far
on the authority of the states.
Nevertheless, Gonzales v. Oregon
was-basically, essentially, apparentlynot decided on constitutional grounds.
Why? What did the Court think its task
was? "The question before us," Justice
Kennedy wrote for the majority, "is
whether the Controlled Substances Act
allows the United States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing
regulated drugs for use in physicianassisted suicide, notwithstanding a state
law permitting the procedure." The
Court was saying that the attorney general's authority is not coterminous with
the federal government's authority. He
has only the powers he is statutorily accorded. He thought the CSA gave him
the authority to issue his rule. Oregon
disagreed.
If the issue was the meaning of the
CSA, did the Court just consult the
statute's language? No. Administrative
agencies of the federal government regularly interpret the statutes from which
they derive their authority. Agencies become expert in their work and in the law
that regulates it, and courts routinely
defer to their expertise in both areas. So
when an agency's interpretation of the
law under which it operates is challenged, courts may defer to it. But when
should they defer, and how much? The
Court has developed several "canons of
construction" to guide it in matching
the level of deference to the particulars
of the situation. These canons of construction are intended to help the regulators, the regulated, and the courts
reach sensible, consistent, and pre-
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dictable conclusions about an agency's
authority.
Thus, at the heart of Gonzales v. Oregon was a debate between Justice
Kennedy's six-justice majority opinion
and Justice Scalia's three-justice minority opinion about which canon of construction was appropriate and what it
meant in the circumstances. In discussing opinions in this column, I ordinarily describe them in enough detail to
make their reasoning clear. Here, however, that detail is prohibitively abundant. To my way of thinking, Justice
Scalia's characteristically sharp and lively
opinion has the better of the argument,
but it did not command a majority, and
that's what counts.
The majority opinion, however, has
one final twist. The last paragraph suggests that the dissent thought that the
CSA "delegates to a single Executive officer the power to effect a radical shift of
authority from the States to the Federal
Government to define general standards
of medical practice." That is, while the
majority showed the federalism issue
out the front door at the beginning of
its opinion, it snuck that issue in the
back door at the end.
Unfortunately, this approach left the
Court's federalism argument undeveloped and unconvincing. For one thing,
the attorney general was hardly trying
"to define general standards of medical
practice." Prescribing controlled substances is but a sliver of medicine.
Worse, the Court's view of federalism is
singularly antique. It has been decades
since the regulation of medicine was
truly confided to the states. The federal
government has long asserted-and the
Supreme Court has long accepted-an
almost maximally expansive view of federal authority. That view is the legacy of
and condition for the New Deal and the
civil rights movement. The Court has in
two recent cases shown that that authority has some limits, but those cases involved statutes on the outmost periphery of the constitutional reach of Congress. And only last year (in Raich), the
Court reaffirmed the New Deal case
(Wickard v. Filburn) that most indulgently viewed the power of Congress.
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More specifically, the federal government has insinuated itself deep into the
fabric of medical care. This is overdetermined and inevitable. First, we now
have a national economy nationally regulated, and roughly fifteen percent of
that economy is devoted to health care.
Much federal regulation that is not
aimed at health care-like antitrust
law-nonetheless affects it. Second, the
federal government is now such a major
purchaser of health care-through the
Veterans Administration, Medicare,
Medicaid, and so on-that its purchasing decisions crucially shape much medical practice. Third, the federal government has routinely conditioned federal
funds on the acquiescence of medical
institutions to hosts of federal regulations. Many of those regulations penetrate far into the world of medical actors
and their patients. Consider the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, that burdensome federal regime
for a core part of medical ethics-confidentiality.
Fourth, the federal government has
anciently and actively regulated medical
care. The CSA itself is an example, but
an even older and broader example is
the Food and Drug Administration and
the army of statutes and regulations that
surrounds it. For that matter, would it
really violate federalism principles for
Congress to institute a program of national health insurance?
This returns me to my starting point.
It is understandable that the press and
public see cases like Gonzales v. Oregon
in terms of their policy consequences.
After all, they do have policy consequences. And no one supposes that even
the justices can purge those consequences and their own preferences from
their minds when they decide cases,
even though they should and do try,
with some success, to do so.
Nevertheless, in America there is a
division of governmental labor; different
parts of government specialize in different kinds of work. They have responsibility for specific sectors of government
and become expert in them. Thus the
Supreme Court's metier is not to set
public policy. It lacks the authority, experience, expertise, and information to

do so. The Court's province (in part) is
to ensure that the jurisdiction of federal
agencies is clearly and predictably established and to resolve disputes about
what the Constitution's federalism principles mean. These duties are more important than making a policy choice
about assisted suicide, because a great
deal in a great many situations turns on
the precedent the Court sets in both
parts of its special province.
In short, one's view of a case should
change according to one's assignment in
the governmental division of labor. For
example, when Michigan had a referendum on assisted suicide, I was acting as
a citizen and quasi-legislator, and I
voted no. Were I the attorney general,
however, I would not have issued the
"Interpretive Rule," largely because prudential (not constitutional) principles of
federalism suggest Oregon should be
left free to be a laboratory of democracy.1 Yet were I a justice, I would have
voted to uphold that rule because I
think the statute authorized it and no
constitutional provision prohibits it.
Even if I uncompromisingly supported
assisted suicide, I would have voted to
uphold the rule. I would have done so
because I would have wanted to protect
the clarity of the canons of construction
that the court has devised for analyzing
agency authority and to preserve the
principles of federalism that have been
developed over decades of national debate.
So where are we now? Congress
could amend the CSA to make the attorney general's authority to issue his
rule plain. If the attorney general reissued the rule, Oregon would be back in
court arguing that the rule exceeded the
federal government's constitutional authority. At that point, the federalism
issue that the Court dealt with obliquely would be directly presented.
1. "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) Q. Brandeis, dissenting).
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